

Power Struggle Over the Mosque: A Study of the Mmi and Kammi Socio-Political Movements

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the struggle for power over the mosque that occurred between the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and the Association of Indonesian Muslim Students (KAMMI) to fight for strategic arenas as political tools to achieve substantive power after the New Order. The author uses a qualitative method with a descriptive analysis approach. Methods of data collection through observation, interviews, and documentation studies with Bukittinggi as the object of research. The findings in this study include the MMI and KAMMI organizations fighting over mosques in the community and campus mosques. Each group will try to win the hearts of the congregation in the mosque to accept their existence. One of them is by following all the activities carried out by the mosque management. They will try to seize the stage by providing taushiyah and religious education to children and youth in the mosque environment. After that, they will replace the old management. The MMI and KAMMI groups make mosques the basis of their struggle in spreading the ideology of organizational struggle. Mastery over the mosque is the first step in the struggle of MMI and KAMMI to achieve organizational goals. The strategy of the MMI and KAMMI groups in achieving their goals is by taking advantage of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and preparing struggle processes.

Keywords: Mosque, Power Struggle, and Struggle Strategy.

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INTRODUCTION

During the New Order government, freedom of speech and politics of Islamic organizations seemed to be restricted. The concept of a democratic state did not seem to apply in the discourse of the New Order government. The impact of the authoritarianism of the New Order caused political Islamic groups consisting of Muhammadiyah, Al Irsyad, Persis, Nahdhatul Ulama, Al Washliyah, PUI (Islamic People's Association), Perti (Islamic Tarbiyah Association), Nahdhatul Wathan, Masyumi and so on to be paralyzed politically and economically, so that they were less trained to become adults in national politics (Bruinessen. 2013. p 21-53).

During the feudal and authoritarian New Order, especially Korpri members, their mentality was restricted for a long time, so that they had no opportunity to offer alternative ideas. They tended to become the government's mouthpiece. It is not surprising that in several elections Golkar always emerged as the winner.

The end of the New Order regime was replaced by the reform era which was predicted to be able to create a democratic and moral political climate. This is marked

by the growth of political Islamic groups in Indonesia. The emergence of many ideological Islamic mass organizations in Indonesia has given rise to new problems in the midst of a pluralistic society. One of them is the struggle for power over mosques.

Mosques that have been known only as places of ritual are used by ideological Islamic groups as a base for their struggle. Ideological Islamic groups try to control mosques in densely populated areas and mosques on secular and religious campuses. The struggle for power over the mosques has given rise to competition between ideological Islamic groups to seize mosque congregations to join their groups, both in terms of political ideology and religious ideology (Heiduk. 2012. p 26-40). The ideological Islamic groups in this article are the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) and the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unity (KAMMI), in this case KAMMI is the wing of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) at the university level. For the MMI and KAMMI groups, mosques are the socio-political base for their struggle in spreading their organizational ideology.

The dynamics of the struggle for mosque power in the country by ideological Islamic organizations cannot be separated from past history. The embryos emerged in the late 1960s, starting from mosque missionary groups on secular campuses. These mosque groups emerged to respond to the "Islamic turn" phenomenon, which was marked by the large demand for religious lecturers on secular campuses (Latif. 2005. p 145). Muslim intellectuals began targeting mosques on secular campuses as an alternative source of new resources that were more independent and free from the control of the New Order rulers. Mosques also changed their function to become base camps for building group strength and expanding networks (Temby. 2010. p 1-36). The establishment of mosques on the campuses of the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) with the Salman mosque and the University of Indonesia (UI) with its Arif Rahman Hakim mosque is believed to be a marker point for the use of mosques as a base for religio-political groups. From the Salman ITB mosque, for example, the Mujahid Da'wah Training (LMD) was born which emphasized basic material about monotheism and the threat of war of thoughts (ghazwul fikr) (Latif. 2005, p 130).

The success of the LMD program began to show ripples of the revival of mosque groups outside campus. In the 1970s, various groups and youth mosque movements emerged throughout Indonesia. Along with the increasing political frustration of the New Order era, the slogan "back to the Mosque" began to become popular. In practice, the campus mosque movement became increasingly fertile (Farida. 2013. p 90-98).

However, in 1978 the strength of the mosque movement began to slacken along with the increasing political repression of the New Order which was marked by the implementation of the Normalization of Campus Life (NKK) so that the politics of organizations on campus including the da'wah movement lost their magical power.

When the repressive structure of the New Order began to change in the late 1990s, the mosque da'wah movement and other ideological Islamic organizations found a political opportunity to close their ranks again. Through the Campus Da'wah Institute (LDK) they translated the movement into a political action group. Even after the fall of the New Order regime, various ideological Islamic organizations such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Jama'ah Tabligh (JT), the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), the Ahlu Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah

Communication Forum, and other organizations demonstrated their existence with mosques as one of the important components of their da'wah and political actions in Indonesia (Fealy. 2004. p 104-121).

This phenomenon of power struggle over mosques is what has been happening in West Sumatra lately, especially in Bukittinggi. The emergence of the spirit of controlling mosques as a basis for the struggle of ideological Islamic groups has led to the grouping of mosques in the Bukittinggi community. The claim of certain Islamic mass organizations over control of mosques has led to ideological conflicts in the Bukittinggi community, West Sumatra. Starting from the background above, this article discusses the power struggle over mosques carried out by the MMI and KAMMI groups in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. This article aims to see and map the power struggle over mosques by the ideological political organizations of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), and the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unity (KAMMI) over mosques, both campus and non-campus, as an effort to build a socio-political base in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra.

METHOD

This study uses a qualitative method as a research procedure that produces descriptive data, sourced from written or oral sources and observable behavior. The type of analytical descriptive research is intended to describe and explain ethnic groups, that in analyzing it will not test hypotheses and will also not analyze statistically.

The researcher chose informants who were experts or considered to know or understand to explain the MMI and KAMMI groups which were the objects of this study. The method of selecting informants was through purposive sampling techniques, namely informants who mastered information related to the problem of the struggle for the mosque, namely the local government, religious leaders, community leaders and the community. In addition, the researcher also used literature related to the problem to assist this study so that understanding of the problem being studied was more comprehensive and detailed.

In this study, data was collected by means of observation. In line with what Lexy Moleong (Moleong. 2000. p 130) expressed, observation is observing the people he studied in their daily lives, seeing what they do, when, with whom and in what circumstances and asking them about their actions. Observations were carried out secretly on KAMMI and MMI activities, both on individual activities and on group activities, especially activities carried out in mosques.

In addition to observation, data collection was carried out through in-depth interviews, which are intended to be a form of communication between two or more people, and involve someone who wants to obtain information (researcher) and someone or a group of other people (informants) by asking questions according to the predetermined objectives. The informants include: the MMI group, KAMMI and mosque congregations. The next stage is the analysis process to draw conclusions regarding the forms of movements, power politics, movement ideology, movement goals, and ideas and activities carried out to realize the ideals of fundamentalist and terrorist groups and strategic steps taken by Indonesia in countering fundamentalist and terrorist movements.

FINDING AND DISCUSSION

RESULT

Struggle Strategy in the Seizure of the Mosque

1. Taking Advantage of Political Opportunities

In taking advantage of this political opportunity, of course it cannot be separated from the political conditions in Indonesia. According to Samuel P. Huntington (2010), there will always be great joy and enthusiasm if a regime that has been in power with authoritarianism collapses. Likewise when the New Order collapsed which was marked by the resignation of Soeharto as President of the Republic of Indonesia and then entering a transition period. This great joy and enthusiasm was based on the dream of the birth of a new order to replace the old order that was indeed damaged.

The process of this political opportunity or opportunity begins with: first, the legitimacy of the state is reduced so that the people are able to form a movement and also a collective identity. Second, there is erosion in the body of the state power itself so that the people are increasingly distrustful and then move a moral movement to oppose power through protests and demonstrations. And third, from the first and second conditions above, various social movement mobilizations will emerge that help encourage and strengthen the process towards the desired transition or change.

These three things were experienced by the New Order. With the mobilization of the movement carried out by students, Soeharto as the icon of the New Order also resigned from his position as president, and this then became a sign that the New Order regime had collapsed. This condition can be called a very vital and urgent political opportunity to be utilized by various interested parties, including political Islamic groups. These political Islamic groups also moved and built organizations that were able to mobilize the masses to make systemic changes (Bruinessen. 2002. p 117-154). After being confined and struggling in underground movements for a long time, the political Islamic movement emerged to the fore as a movement organization that had a very clear and explicit platform or ideology and was widely exposed, namely upholding Islamic law and building an Islamic caliphate.

But what is certain is that this political opportunity stage is an exploration stage to form an established organization that is able to establish its existence more firmly and be organized firmly. And usually, this political opportunity stage is always accompanied by various protests and demonstrations against everything that political Islamic groups consider to be contrary to Islamic teachings. utilizing existing political opportunities to put pressure directly or indirectly on the government and the existing system (Sirozi, 2005: 81-120). In carrying out protest or demonstration activities, structural elements must be considered. If the structural elements are very strong, then protest or demonstration activities should not be carried out; vice versa, if they are weak, then that is the political opportunity that must be utilized as well as possible. This is what the political Islamic movement has done during its existence in Indonesia. During the very strong New Order regime, political Islam carried out underground movements by trying to consolidate power internally and strengthen the mass base in order to become militant and dedicated cadres.

However, after the New Order regime fell, political Islam moved and organized itself and its power in a real way through a series of social movements and protest

actions but sympathetic which continued to be interwoven and linked following the existing conditions and situations. In addition, it also moved to socialize all forms of programs and visions and missions of the organization continuously and responsibly openly to the public. Political Islam utilized the reform as a political opportunity and a golden opportunity to voice its ideas about the obligation and importance of upholding Islamic law and the caliphate for Muslims massively and openly.

Thanks to the blessings of reform, the political Islamic movement grew like mushrooms in the rainy season. They developed rapidly in Indonesia. With the freedom of expression and political activities of association and assembly in the reform era, they were free to hold various activities to preach to realize the establishment of Islamic law and the caliphate and also to recruit members openly (al-Makassary. 2010. p 190-192).

Thanks to the blessings of reform, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council grew and developed rapidly in Indonesia. With the freedom of expression and political activity – association and assembly in the reform era, MMI is very free to carry out various activities to preach to realize the establishment of Islamic law and the caliphate and also to recruit members openly.

In addition, the general public who are interested in MMI ideas also do not need to be afraid and worried about getting stereotypes or even intimidation from the government when they want to join MMI. And so far, there has never been intimidation or the like from anywhere including the government. This happens because one of the methods used by MMI is to fight without violence and the MMI's field of struggle is more at the level of consciousness, so that any crime cannot be imposed on MMI.

With the political opportunities in the reform era, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council has the best position to realize its mission, namely to uphold Islamic law within the framework of the caliphate state. The Mujahidin Council has the freedom to move openly, safely and massively without getting pressure, terror and intimidation from the government and other parties. Even in Indonesia, MMI activists can easily preach in executive, legislative and military circles.

Political opportunities for the Mujahidin Council like this only exist in Indonesia because all the Mujahidin Council movements other than in Indonesia are still underground movements, even in other countries, especially in the Middle East, many MMI activists are tortured, arrested, and thrown into prison (Latif. 2005. p 140).

Likewise, the KAMMI group movement in utilizing political opportunities, the growth of the KAMMI group began after the fall of the New Order. KAMMI utilized the political opportunity by spreading KAMMI's cadres to mosques in Bukittinggi, to control the mosques and spread the religious ideology and the KAMMI group movement, the ideology developed was the ideology of the caliphate state and the implementation of Islamic law.

2. Mobilizing Structures

To achieve the movement's target, KAMMI and MMI carried out various strategic activities, one of which was to carry out collective coaching (*tatsqif jama'iy*) which was part of open da'wah to the people after the formation of an official and legal organization in Indonesia. This could not be avoided, because the political opportunities that occurred after the fall of the New Order regime had to be utilized optimally by

carrying out internal and external consolidation and mobilization. Moreover, opportunities or chances like this are very rare in other countries where the Mujahidin Assembly operates, so it must become a milestone for the flying of the ideas and principles of the Mujahidin Assembly (Bruinessen. 2002. p 117-154).

Collective guidance (*tatsqif jama'iy*) is carried out by guiding Muslims in general with Islamic ideas and laws adopted by MMI (Latif. 2005. p 138). Collective guidance is aimed at all communities, both campus and non-campus communities. The targets of *da'wah* in society include all elements, both elite and grass-roots (lower society). The elite layer of society includes structural elites that include all government elites such as the executive, legislative, police, military, and political parties as well as non-structural elites such as *ulama*, *kiai*, and other community leaders. The targets of campus *da'wah* also include all components, both students and lecturers and employees, including campus leaders. The collective development has four objectives, namely: 1) introducing MMI to the wider community, 2) socializing the big ideas of MMI such as the obligation and importance of enforcing the Islamic caliphate for all Muslims and explaining to the community that the total implementation of Islamic law is the solution to various crises that occur in Indonesia and in the world, 3) gaining support from all elements of society in the struggle to uphold Islamic law in total, and 4) as an inducement for the community to join as members of MMI by participating in recruitment and fighting together with MMI in upholding Islamic law within the framework of the caliphate (Gaus AF. 2010. p 45-57).

This collective coaching is carried out by MMI members both individually and institutionally. Individually, MMI members are always reminded and called upon to always actively participate in all activities in the mosque. All worship is called upon to always be carried out in the mosque, such as praying five times a day in congregation, reading the Qur'an, and participating in various other activities held in the mosque. By always actively participating in *mahdhah* worship and other mosque activities, in the end MMI members who are always active in the mosque are involved in various activities and even involved in the management of the mosque (*takmir*) and are entrusted with the mandate to organize and fill various activities in the mosque (Interview with Burhan, 2022). Collective coaching is also carried out by holding visits to friendship (*audiences*) to various government agencies and other elements of society. This is done to obtain support and assistance from various parties who have real power in the midst of society. This activity is called *thalab al-nusrah* (mobilizing support and assistance), which aims to achieve two things, namely: *himayah* (protection of those carrying out *da'wah*) so that they can continue to carry out their *da'wah*, and also as an intermediary to realize power in order to uphold Islamic law within the framework of the Islamic caliphate.

3. Framing Process

In framing this movement process, political Islamic groups make various efforts to realize all the ideals and struggles of the organization, namely the establishment of Islamic law and even the establishment of the Islamic caliphate. In this context, there are two very important things to put forward, namely carrying out intellectual struggles (*al-shira' al-fikri*) and also political struggles (*al-kifah as-siyasi*). Intellectual struggles are

carried out by opposing various beliefs, ideologies, rules, and corrupt thoughts; rejecting all false beliefs and wrong and deviant thoughts by exposing their deviation and contradictions with Islam; and cleansing the people from all influences of blasphemous thoughts and systems (Gaus AF. 2010. p 45-57).

Intellectual struggles are carried out by KAMMI and MMI political Islam through various means such as print and electronic media. Print media used as a means include the publication of various books, magazines, the weekly al-Islam bulletin, and various leaflets distributed to the public. The Islamic political groups KAMMI and MMI also utilize electronic media, namely the internet, by creating various websites. With an Islamic nuance, the website content contains the ideology of their group's struggle.

The political system used in Indonesia is a democratic political system. Democracy teaches that sovereignty and power are in the hands of the people. In other words, the highest right to create laws is in the hands of the people. KAMMI and MM view the democratic system as the most diametrically opposed ideology to political Islam and at the same time a source of disaster, because if humans are given the opportunity to make laws, then the laws made will always be influenced by their own interests, their groups, influenced by the environment, limited by place, bound by time, era, and so on. Thus, the resulting laws will certainly cause disputes, conflicts, tyranny, and injustice so that in the end it will cause destruction to humanity. Power without a moral basis, sooner or later will certainly have a bad impact on the order of life of the nation and state. Efforts to build and maintain togetherness are merely rhetoric, what emerges are egos disguised as hypocrisy. Positions in the government structure are no longer considered a mandate to fight for the fate of the people, but rather a fertile ground for indulging personal desires or group interests (Latif. 2005. p 135).

As a result, in order to occupy a certain position, people do not hesitate to justify any means. Such as exploiting the masses to show strength, political money to recruit support, manipulating election numbers, and so on. Even if necessary, the people are used as scapegoats in political engineering. So that gradually a negative image was born: politics is dirty. This strategy in controlling mosques is used by MMI and KAMMI in spreading their religious ideology, as well as becoming a forum for KAMMI and MMI to spread the ideology of movements that have nuances of political Islam. So it is not surprising that we see many realities today that the mosques around us have been controlled by certain ideological groups.

DISCUSSION

Control of Mosques as a Basis for Struggle

Sociologically, there are several arenas of struggle for MMI and KAMMI in their organizational practices, namely institutional, community, and institutional-based arenas. However, in this discussion we will only discuss the role of mosques in the MMI and KAMMI movements. In the view of MMI and KAMMI, mosques are a very strategic arena for struggle in spreading the religious and political ideology of their groups.

The strategic meaning of mosques for MMI and KAMMI is "The mosque is a place of worship, a place for people to gather, and there they can easily hold events and develop the community". Mosques are the center of community activities even though the reality is not like that. Here it can be seen that mosques are an arena for the

transformation of ideas, concepts, thoughts of MMI and KAMMI as well as a center for developing and developing community cadres. The current phenomenon of mosques only seems like a place to perform the ritual of obligatory prayers (congregation) and such, because after the congregational ritual is finished, the mosque returns to its original situation, quiet and without productive activity. This provides a great opportunity for MMI and KAMMI to play a role in maximizing the function of the mosque as a center for all activities such as education, training, cadreship, health, preaching, and other activities. The strategic role of the mosque makes MMI and KAMMI take the initiative to utilize this opportunity as an arena for 'investment' of power (Farahati. 2011. p 146-152).

In fact, in order to support the tactic of facilitating and accelerating the course of political preaching in mosques, MMI and KAMMI classify mosques into two, namely campus and non-campus mosques. Campus/school mosques are mosques that become places or arenas for the struggle of MMI and KAMMI through ideas, thoughts, concepts, and values or ideological views intended for intellectuals (educated). On the other hand, non-campus mosques are mosques that are not located or far from campuses and are intended for the general public, who are in fact non-educated (Sunaryo. 2017. p 225-248). First, campus-based mosques. Campus mosques as the arena for KAMMI's struggle are mostly spread across public and Islamic campuses in West Sumatra such as Andalas University (UNAND), Padang State University (UNP), Bung Hatta University, and other campuses. Thoughts about Islam are developing rapidly, as seen from the formation of a network whose embryo originated from UNAND and spread to UNP.

In its development, MMI and KAMMI continued to try to massively spread the magical power of their new ideas in UNAND and UNP not only in the form of public religious studies. MMI and KAMMI also expanded into other activities so that control over the UNAND and UNP mosques was in the hands of KAMMI. The dominant factor of controlling mosque activities made other organizations such as the Islamic Student Association (HMI) and Gema Pembebasan almost have no place in UNAND. That way, KAMMI's struggle in UNAND did not experience any significant ideological struggle between Islamic organizations or elements.

Second, non-campus-based mosques. Non-campus mosques have a very large role in supporting MMI's struggle in regions or sectors at the district level. For example, KAMMI and the Bukittinggi-Agam branch of MMI. In Bukittinggi-Agam there are hundreds of mosques and 50 of them are the base or arena for MMI and KAMMI struggle. The author was quite intensive in conducting observations involved in the Syuhada' mosque, the historical factor of the MMI struggle in the Agam sector apparently started from this mosque.

Young people are the main actors in conceptualizing the operational activities in the mosque. The tradition of the youth's role still exists until now and its intensity has increased with the use of the Syuhada' Mosque as the center of MMI activities throughout Bukittinggi City in holding activities. The variety of MMI activities at the Syuhada' Mosque can be specified based on separate segments. The segment of children aged kindergarten to elementary school has special activities in the form of the Al-Quran Education Park (TPA) every Wednesday at 16.00 WIB to 17.30 WIB. At the TPA, the children, numbering more than 20 people, learn iqra', practice worship, memorize

short verses, morals, and don't forget to insert creative ideas about the Khilafah and Islamic law through the song "la iyyaka illa bi al-Islam, the song "Uphold the sharia with the Khilafah" and so on. The introduction of khilafah songs specifically for children is sung together as a diversion with the aim of instilling their love for Islam. In addition, TPA activities are also used as an event for early socialization of children so that they are familiar with Islamic law. The hope is that TPA children can socialize Islamic law/the khilafah to their parents (Rahmat. 2005. p 10-13).

Teenagers' religious studies, and small halaqahs called murakazah. The murakazah halaqah is a small but intensive halaqah study which functions to recruit potential teenagers to then be empowered. In this empowerment, their activities collected, supervised, and given Islamic materials that have been formatted according to the standard syllabus in the form of materials on sharia, aqidah to da'wah movements. The maximum number of participants is 10 people. Tadarus Al-Quran takes place every Friday night after Isya which is attended by almost 10 young men.

Each tadarus halaqah is attended by one musyrif or guide. The function of the musyrif here is as a reading guide for the participants who read verse by verse in turn. After the Koran reading is finished, the musyrif will explain the essence of the verse read, then close with a prayer. Tadarus functions as a provision of the Koran to prospective KAMMI cadres or cadres before preaching in their communities. Here the love for the Koran is truly instilled from adolescence.

Recitation activities for young people or teenagers take place once a month at the Syuhada Mosque. In this routine recitation, speakers are brought in from KAMMI cadres or sympathizers. The dissemination and socialization of KAMMI's thoughts appears in every study material which is the hallmark of its political preaching.

The adult segment consists of recitations for mothers and fathers. Mothers' recitations are routinely held every Sunday evening from 20.00 WIB to 21.30 WIB, while fathers' recitations are held every Thursday evening at the same time. These two pengajian almost entirely involve KAMMI cadres, starting from the organizers and speakers. KAMMI's ideas and thoughts, especially those related to matters of faith, worship, and current issues, are also disseminated. Participants in these pengajian are specifically for the general public who live around the Syuhada' mosque, some even come from neighboring villages. The routine pengajian is deliberately packaged in an interesting way with speakers who are a little funny and use Malay, the everyday language of the pengajian congregation so that they are interested and continue to attend continuously.

As the author has explained above, the MMI and KAMMI groups use mosques as a base for their struggle in developing the group's ideology and understanding of religion. The mosque that has been claimed by MMI as the base for their struggle, the KAMMI group will not dare to enter the mosque, and vice versa. The religious and political ideologies carried by MMI and KAMMI are in principle almost the same, namely the same ideology of Islamic law and the Khilafah state, however, KAMMI in spreading their ideology is more soft and uses an emotional religious approach, in the form of social activities under the guise of religion. Likewise with their da'wah method in mosques in spreading religious and political ideology, KAMMI which is a wing of the PKS party will openly invite the community and mosque congregations to join PKS. This can

be seen from the KAMMI da'wah method which often mentions Islamic leaders who are analogous to the story of the leadership of the prophet's companions in the past.

CONCLUSION

The emergence of ideological Islamic organizations such as KAMMI and MMI in the Indonesian political arena, especially Islamic politics at the beginning of the reformation until now, is the result of the manipulative and pragmatic political games of the pre- and post-reform regimes. This can be seen from the betrayal of the Old Order regime against the implementation of the contents of the Jakarta Charter, the castration of the New Order regime over the extraordinary role of Islamic groups, and the defeat of Islamic parties in the 1999 and 2004 elections. The manipulative regime and defeat in the elections have implications for the increasingly closed political opportunities for the return of the Jakarta Charter and the formalization of Islamic law in state and regional government institutions in Indonesia, including in Bukittinggi. In this context, KAMMI and MMI feel called and obliged to continue the struggle for political Islamic power by formulating the direction of their struggle through ideological Islamic political organizations. The concept of struggle offered by KAMMI and MMI is a struggle to seize symbolic power through control of arenas spread across various places: institutions, communities, and government institutions (bureaucracy) with distinctive approach patterns. These arenas of struggle can be classified as follows. First, KAMMI's arena of struggle includes: one, an institution-based arena in the form of campus and non-campus mosques, public and Islamic schools from kindergarten to high school, public and Islamic campuses spread across Bukittinggi. Two, a community-based arena consisting of mosque administrators, lecturers, students, religious study groups, integrated health posts, workers, and tahlilan. Three, an arena based on regional government institutions such as the executive and legislative.

Second, the arena of MMI's struggle, namely: one, the institution-based arena includes mosques, public and Islamic schools, and Islamic boarding schools. Two, the community-based arena consists of intellectual communities and religious study groups. MMI and KAMMI compete for power over mosques in Bukittinggi, especially to make it easier for them to spread their religious ideology and organizational ideology. Both KAMMI and MMI use mosques as a political Islamic movement that they carry. One of the most powerful strategies in spreading the action and ideology of the political Islamic movement that they understand is by winning the hearts of the mosque congregation, then they will replace the old mosque administrators. When control over the mosque has been truly implemented, they will fill the religious studies in the mosque with their group's understanding and ideology.

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