Multiculturalism Education Is An Effort To Counteract Identity Politics

This research discusses the role of the state in counteracting identity politics in Indonesia. This research is a research library research. The researcher tries to collect literature related to the role of the state in counteracting identity politics. The type of this research is library research. Data collection techniques through documentation, literature, mass media. The findings of this paper are as follows, that in counteracting identity politics that occurs in society where identity politics in the name of culture and religion will become a threat to the integrity of the state. The state in this case must play an active role in counteracting identity politics so that it does not develop in society. one of the efforts made by the state is by providing an understanding to the public of the importance of multiculturalism. The plural Indonesian society is a cultural identity and is a gift from God for Indonesian society. This multicultural education needs to be developed by the state so that identity politics does not develop.


INTRODUCTION
The role of the State in identity politics referred to in this discussion is related to the issue of how the role played by the State so that politics does not spread in the name of ethnicity, ethnicity and religion which can threaten plurality.
The state has a very strategic role in suppressing the development and expansion of identity politics which can threaten plurality. Identity politics that is rooted and strengthened in the midst of Sumatran society when allowed to develop will become an embryo for the emergence of conflicts in the name of ethnicity, ethnicity and religion. This is because identity issues, as the researchers discussed in the previous discussion, began to emerge and develop among the people of Sumatra.
The strengthening and development of identity politics in the midst of a plural society in Sumatra will have a negative impact on minority communities in Sumatra. Although in principle ethnic, ethnic and religious identities also began to strengthen in the midst of minority communities. This identity in the name of ethnicity, ethnicity and religion must be accommodated by the State so as not to spread into the embryo of conflict in the name of ethnicity, ethnicity and religion.
The issue of identity that strengthens among the Sumatran people, such as the Malay identity strengthens with its Malayness, with the assumption that North Sumatra is a Deli Malay community, then the Batak ethnicity their identity is also strengthened by their Batakness, Javanese ethnicity with their Javaneseness, Chinese and Keling ethnicities with their respective ethnicities and religions. -respectively.
Each ethnic group tries to maintain their own group identity. Strengthening ethnic, ethnic and religious identities is carried out as an effort to maintain the group identity of each ethnic group, ethnicity and religion.
The state must be able to accommodate the strengthening of ethnic, tribal and religious issues, while at the same time trying to unite the vision and mission of each ethnic, ethnic and religious group to create a harmonious society and away from problems of conflict in the name of ethnicity, ethnicity and religion. This can be done by strengthening the role of each ethnic, tribal and religious figure. By creating and optimizing the role of FKUB, the role of ethnic and religious leaders of each group in Sumatra.
Meanwhile, people think that ethnicity is something that is "classic", an obsolete matter. As modernists believe, in the modern world, ethnicity will disappear or at least be replaced by social entities based on the economy, class, party or other interest groups. Ethnic sentiment is shifted by class consciousness, ethnic politics is replaced by class politics, nationalism is shifted by globalism.
Since the Second World War ended, our world has been colored by ethnic and religious conflicts. Conflicts between countries left over from the Second World War are receding, replaced by internal conflicts between ethnic-religious and between ethnicreligious and the state (Hudgson, 1974). Many countries are now facing the problem of internal ethnic-religious conflict, including Indonesia, as happened in Kalimantan, Maluku, Aceh, Papua and so on.
Our world also presents the reality that ethnicity has never subsided from the face of the earth. Modernization and capitalism cannot destroy it, on the contrary, they revive it in a new form. The mode of production of capitalism actually produces separate ethnic groupings and mobilizations. It has even encouraged the emergence of ethnic-religious political radicalism as a form of resistance to modernization and capitalism, as happened in the case of the emergence of religious-traditional fundamentalism everywhere today (Giddens, 1994).
The constellation of relations between ethnic groups that can result in integration or conflict is heavily influenced by external forces, especially the State. State policies can result in integration when assimilation is either forced in the form of incorporation or voluntarily through the process of amalgamation (Alan R, 1983).
Incorporation occurs when a group merges the identity of another group within itself. Amalgamation occurs when two or more groups combine to form a new unit, usually a large group, such as the formation of a nation in a pluralistic society. On the other hand, state policies can lead to disintegration when these policies lead to differentiation, either in the form of division or proliferation.
Division occurs when one ethnic group is divided into two or more groups. Proliferation occurs when one or more ethnic groups produce additional new groups within themselves. The process of integration and disintegration as a result of State policies is very dynamic, attracts, shifts, changes and overlaps with one another.
This can encourage inter-community integration or conversely conflict and segregation between communities. Fair political and economic policies that can be accessed by various ethnic groups, for example, can result in two ethnic communities uniting in various political and economic activities. Likewise, it is believed that the format of concessional democracy can accommodate various political interests of ethnic groups in a pluralistic society.
But not infrequently this creates conflict between communities. This happens when unification as a result of state policy is not accompanied by a clear and systematic process of assimilation resulting in fierce competition and a struggle for political, power, economic and cultural resources. If the policy is not accompanied by a formula for the distribution of power and political, economic, cultural resources that is clear and accepted by various groups, then this can lead to severe conflict. Especially this can happen when the binding bond, either on the basis of shared interests or forced by the incorporation of the State, is no longer effective in binding relations between ethnic groups.
Severe conflicts that have occurred between communities in Maluku, Kalimantan, Poso and so on in Indonesia recently are some cases of conflicts that have occurred when political-economic policies have not been accompanied by assimilation policies and clear formulations in the distribution of political, economic and power resources between them.
State policies can also raise serious problems in the relationship between ethnic groups and the state itself. In many countries, including Indonesia, the state is often used as a tool by certain dominant ethnic groups who join in the formula of cultural despotism. The modern state is a determinant of the division of labor among ethnic groups which distributes economic values and resources often unfairly. Monocultural control by an ethnic group over the State apparatus or ethnocracy often occurs (Johnston, 1999).
Ethnicization of the State by certain ethnic groups occurs in many countries, both by the majority or minority ethnic groups, including in Indonesia. Minority ethnocracy occurs for example in the Middle East, among others. Meanwhile in Turkey (Turkish Muslims against Kurds and other minorities) and in Egypt (Muslims against Copts) the form of the majority ethnocracy is relatively stable. In Southeast Asia, the ethnocracy of the majority is relatively stable in Indonesia (Javanese Muslims against other ethnicities), Malaysia (Malays against Chinese and Indians) and Singapore (Chinese against Malays and other ethnicities). Meanwhile, the Philippines and Thailand are relatively unstable majority ethnocracies (Setyaningrum, 2003).
Minority ethnocracy against other majorities often tends to be unstable compared to the majority ethnocracy. However, this is not always the case when accompanied by unfair economic policies. Economic factors such as regional economic disparities and competition for government resources, especially government jobs, often create their own instability. The state itself is an enormous economic resource and power which is always contested by various ethnic communities. If it is not accompanied by fair economic policies so that social inequality occurs, it can threaten disintegration. Politically and economically marginalized ethnic groups will tend to separate themselves or self-determine if they are not accommodated. This paper will examine the issue of how the role of the state is in counteracting identity politics and to what extent identity politics can be a solution for the state in counteracting identity politics.

METHOD
This research is a qualitative research, the method that will be used is descriptive analytic method, it is intended that the accumulation of basic data in a descriptive manner is solely not necessary to look for or explain mutual relationships, does not test hypotheses, and does not make predictions.
This research is a socio-political research that focuses on the issue of multicultural education in counteracting identity politics. The focus of the study in this research is to determine the role of the state in counteracting identity politics by means of multicultural education. This research is a research library research. The data in this study uses the literature related to the research problem.

FINDING AND DISCUSSION The Politicization of Cultural Identity
The first thing that must be understood is that identity politics is not politics in its traditional sense. Identity politics focuses on identity differences which include ethnicity, religion, and other things that are used to unite people on the basis of similarities. Identity politics is a sub-discipline of political science that is empirical in nature and began to be discussed in the 1960s. In 1967, the first meeting held by the international political science association discussed biology and politics.
The emergence of a feeling of belonging to the same identity as ethnicity, for example, is based on the tendency within each human group to distinguish between insiders and outsiders, to draw social boundaries, and tendencies to build stereotypes about "other groups." This tendency to build stereotypes about other groups is actually a way to support and justify these social boundaries. Eriksen emphasized that ethnicity arises when "perceived cultural differences will result in social differences" (ethnicity occurs when perceived cultural differences make a social difference). Ethnicity arises because of the interaction of groups that feel "different", when the distinction between "us" and "them" becomes important (Revida, 2006).
Identity politics is political action to promote the interests of members of a group because they have the same identity or characteristics, whether based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion. Identity politics is another formulation of the politics of difference.
The emergence of identity politics is a response to the implementation of human rights which are often unfairly applied. He further said that concretely, the presence of identity politics was deliberately carried out by groups of people who experienced marginalization. Their political rights and freedom of belief have so far received very significant obstacles.
Identity Politics is related to efforts ranging from simply channeling aspirations to influence policies, mastery over the distribution of values that are seen as valuable to the most fundamental demand, namely self-determination on the principle of primordialism.
In the ethnic format, identity politics is reflected first in efforts to incorporate values into regional regulations, separating administrative areas, the desire to implement special autonomy until the emergence of a separatist movement. Meanwhile, in the religious context, identity politics is reflected in various efforts to include religious values in the policy-making process, including the regional regulations regarding sharia, as well as efforts to make a city synonymous with a particular religion.
Theoretically, the emergence of identity politics is a phenomenon caused by many factors, such as: structural aspects in the form of past economic disparities and also continuing economic difficulties so that today it has provided reasons to justify efforts to separate itself from a primordial group linked to aspects of political and institutional representation.

The Politicization of Religious Identity
Identity is one of the various choices to be able to understand and practice cultural traditions. As an extreme form of the politicization of cultural differences, identity is not limited to a particular culture, or to a particular civilization, such as Islam, although there are many views against it.
Ethnic identity is also not an instrument of analysis, as examples can be found in other cultures, but perhaps the way it is applied in other cultures through different perspectives. On the other hand, all world cultures are shown to be in the form of barriers of discussion and social discourse which are inherently very diverse and dynamic. Within these cultures, to varying degrees, identity emerges; and in all of these cultures, identity is an expression that finds itself opposed to the whole cultural identity.
Empirical comparisons that span all cultures show that under certain conditions each culture produces identity flows along with the modernization and traditionalization that surround it. Despite wide differences in cultural settings, its structure and function exhibit the same characteristics everywhere and feed into the political and psychological needs in all cultures, namely the need for certainty, identity and recognition for those who are isolated or threatened by a higher power. or by development development.
In each of these cultures, the identity of the local community declared war on the two competing streams, namely modernism and traditionalism, and unwaveringly sought to restore the true identity of the traditional culture which was in a slump at that time, by reviving it by taking control of power. politics and achieve absolute supremacy. In this way, society is completely liberated from the sufferings of modernization contradictions.
With the end of the East-West conflict, different cultural patterns have become even clearer as basic values and forms of life, as collective brands and hopes. This lesserknown fact did not so much succeed in impressing the minds of the masses in the years that followed the ideological era, as much as it failed its attempt to become a center of publicity and political exploitation.
Conceived in part for political purposes, exaggerated in part to maintain recognition, swallowed up by a disoriented public with a feeling of relief at a safe distance from unpleasant events, a sense of cultural awareness and with it an awareness of cultural differences seems to have taken over the state of the greatest confrontation that dominated this century. 20th.
The politicization of cultural differences occurs both inside and outside. From within represents a strategy of fundamentalism which seeks to convince us that the evil that has arisen in the world can only be cured, if the demands of certainty held by the fundamental leaders in each case can take place without fear of contradiction. From the outside it represents the strategy of outsiders such as Huntington who, without being a fundamentalist himself, opens the way for fundamentalism by expressing the statement that civilization that has spread in the world is fundamentally fundamental (Huntington, 1996).
The issue of identity that is currently happening in Sumatra is mostly carried out by the issue of religious identity. Religious identity is used as political material to reach the power of the majority group in Sumatran society. The issue of the politicization of religious identity is also growing rapidly in almost all parts of Sumatra.
The politicization of religion which is used as a new political identity for the majority group in Sumatra is marked by the growth of fundamentalist religious identity groups. Religious fundamentalist groups have a very large role and contribution in changing the pattern of identity politicization in Sumatra.
Fundamentalism is a 20th century ideology that recruits its members on the basis of shared ethnic and religious characteristics. Experiences of humiliation, suffering, hopelessness, or lack of recognition contributed greatly to his political success.
By combining elements of the pragmatically dualist modern age with aspects of dogma originating from pre-modern traditions, fundamentalism seeks to attack the basic structures and consequences of intolerance in the modern era -for which it has no support -using modern tools and by means of modern.
Politicized religious identity into religious identity politics creates new problems among the people of Sumatra, as the author explained in the previous discussion, that religious identity on the one hand benefits the majority group and on the other hand is detrimental to the minority group.
During the New Order government, a uniform policy was carried out. It is taboo for the people to talk about ethnicity, religion and race (SARA). The New Order government mobilized the issue of SARA to control society through language and ethnicity. Throughout the reign of the New Order government, the State tried to standardize cultural differences for the sake of 'national development' (for example, to promote tourism).
Space for ethnic differences is allowed as long as it does not endanger the 'national interest'. Indeed, the ideology of the Indonesian State "Unity in Diversity" explicitly recognizes cultural differences and the role of these cultural differences in determining the character of the Indonesian nation as a plural and tolerant society.
But at the present time it seems that the State has lost control over the processes of cultural identity that were once tried to be uniformed for the interests of the development of the State. Now since the fall of the Suharto government, it appears that in many areas the order of priority has been effectively reversed. Now, thoughts on national development and national modernization have been replaced with ethnic-based conflicts related to the issue of unequal development and marginalization of indigenous (indigenous) communities.
The biggest impact of uniformity during the ORBA period was the loss of the cultural treasures of minority ethnic groups. Now all the tribes are finally caught up in an identity conflict. This is all because the government with its policies ultimately affects the identity of every citizen. Various methods were used by the New Order government to domesticate ethnic identities in order to accommodate them into the framework of nationbuilding processes. Indonesian governance actually continues the ways of the Dutch Colonial in forming this identity (Setyaningrum, 2003. The political situation in Indonesia in general is still very primordial. Political issues still revolve around ethnicity and religion. Even political parties were founded on that basis. This oriented political trend is very worrying, especially for a region that consists of various religions and ethnic groups, such as West Kalimantan.
History proves that in many countries atrocities for the sake of atrocities are committed in the name of religion and ethnic nationalism. Northern Ireland, for example, is still raging with a civil war between Protestants and Catholics. In India, the Muslim minority group that is in the midst of a Hindu-majority society is constantly experiencing threats to life and property. This is what is currently happening in the Middle East on Palestinian land.
The use of religious symbols or what is termed a political religion is very dangerous and can cause serious conflict in the political system of a country. The divisions that occur due to political conflicts based on religion are more severe than the divisions caused by other factors. This was proven by Richard Rose in his study of Christian voters in Belgium (Rosental, 2001. Indonesian society, although the majority is Muslim, is very diverse in terms of ethnicity, nation, religion, social and economic standard of living, political attitudes, level of education, village-urban way of life, and so on. In addition, the social organization and political currents that developed were still influenced by animism and mystical beliefs from the Hindu-Buddhist religions that were adhered to by the people before the arrival of Islam to Indonesia. Based on the results of the 2000 population census, the total population of Indonesia on June 30, 2000 was 206,264,595 people (Danandjaja, 2003). Out of this number, 88% are Muslim -which means the number of Muslims in Indonesia as of 30 June 2000 was 181,512,843 people. In addition, around 59.19% of the total population of Indonesia live on the island of Java or 122,088,013 people, the rest live outside Java (Danandjaja, 2003).
Islam in Indonesia is heavily influenced by the Javanese Islamic style as said by Hefner (Hefner, 1987): "… the Islam as practiced in Indonesia could in its early stages associate itself closely with the religious tradition of the Hindu period, for the from in which it was introduced had already been largely adapted to the mystical religious atmosphere of India". Therefore, the Hindu-Buddhist beliefs held by the people before the advent of Islam, are difficult to eradicate, especially among the Javanese, even though they have embraced Islam.
According to (Robert Jay, 1983) the process of Islamization in Java went through two patterns. First, in areas where the influence of Hindu-Buddhist religious values is minimal, there is a tendency to transform Javanese society into Muslim students who are santri (orthodox), such as in urban areas on the north coast of Java island, for example in Ngampel (Surabaya), Bonang, Gresik, Demak, Tuban, Jepara and Cirebon. In these areas, the process of Islamization took the form of peaceful penetration (penetration pacific). Second, in areas where the influence of Hindu-Buddhist civilization is strong, the process of Islamization is largely characterized by the struggle for followers between the two religious traditions, namely Islam with its monotheistic monotheistic teachings dealing with Javanese beliefs which are still colored by the influence of religious values. Hindu-Buddhist religious values that are animistic and mystical. So even though Islam has succeeded in penetrating through da'wah activities, the ideological integrity and traditional Javanese way of life have been maintained.
Clifford Geertz who investigated the Javanese community in Modjokuto, East Java, found that the Javanese-Islamic community was split into 3 (three) cultural groups, namely abangan, santri and priyayi.
According to (Geertz, 1990) that: Abangan represents an emphasis on the animist aspects of all Javanese syncretism and is broadly related to the peasant element among the population; Santri represent an emphasis on Islamic aspects of the above syncretism and are generally related to trade elements (also certain elements in farmer groups); Priyayi emphasizes aspects of Hindiusm related to bureaucratic elements.
However, some Indonesian analysts criticize the results of the investigation (Geertz, 1990). They generally disagreed with the variant he formulated which divided Javanese society into three groups. Even so, almost no one disputes that in Javanese society there are abangan and santi groups.
These three groups (santri, abangan and priyayi), began to receive attention during the 1955 general election to elect members of parliament and constituent members. He became a struggle for the influence of political parties competing in the general election campaign. The results show that the santri group directs their political choices to secular (nationalist) and communist parties such as the Indonesian National Party (PNI) or the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).
The results of the 1955 general election provide a clear picture of the political map in Indonesia. Islamic parties supported by the santri group only received 43.5% of the vote.
Meanwhile, the nationalist secular parties and the communist parties, which were supported by the abangan and priyayi groups, received more support, namely around 52%. The Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo) received 2.5% of the vote, while the Catholic Party received 2.0% (Danandjaja, 2003).
In the 1955 general election, the only Islamic party that received significant vote support from the Javanese community was the NU party, especially in East Java. Meanwhile, the Masyumi party received a large number of votes from outside Java. Because the majority of people do not support Islamic parties, their number of votes, both in the parliament and in the constituent assembly, is smaller than that of secular nationalist and communist groups, so that Islamic parties fail to fight for Islam as the foundation of the state.
After Indonesia entered the reformation era, and carried out the 1999 general election democratically, the results were not much different from the 1955 general election results. Islamic parties continued to experience defeat in gaining support from voters, even worse than before. In the 1999 election, Islamic parties included the National Awakening Party (PKB) which was founded by Abdurrahman Wahid, and received support from Nahdhatul Ulama, as well as the National Mandate Party (PAN) led by M. Amien Rais (Muhammadiyah) which did not openly declare as Islamic parties, all of them only received 37.19% of the vote, which means that the support obtained by Islamic parties decreased by 6.31% compared to the results of the 1955 general election.
Likewise, in the general election to elect members of parliament in 2004, the Islamic parties that participated in the contest only won votes for the DPR RI, namely the United Development Party (PPP) 8.15%, Crescent Star Party (PBB) 2.62%, Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) 7.34%, Reform Star Party (PBR) 2.44%, and the Indonesian Nahdatul Ummah Association (PNUI) 0.79%. Thus, the total number of votes acquired by Islamic political parties in the 2004 general election was 21.4%.
If that number is added to the 6.44% vote obtained by the National Mandate Party (PAN), which does not declare itself an Islamic party, but its support base is Muslims, namely the Nahdiyin for PKB, and Muhammadiyah for PAN, then the total vote gain is only 38.41%. This means that there is an increase in the number of votes acquired by Islamic political parties and Islamic-based political parties by 1.22% compared to the results of the 1999 general elections.
Even so, the acquisition of Islamic political parties in the 2004 general election and Islamic mass-based parties was still below the vote acquisition of Islamic political parties in the 1955 general election of 5.09%, because in 1955, the political parties Islamic politics won the support of 43.5% of voters.
With the number of votes acquired by Islamic political parties and the two Islamic mass-based political parties, it can be said that they must work even harder in the future to convince Muslim voters that they can bring improvements and can save Indonesia, if they given the trust by the people in the next election and rule Indonesia.
Such a situation occurs, partly because the Javanese are the majority of other ethnic groups, which make up 47% of the total population of Indonesia, especially the abangan, who are generally "little people" who live on the grassroots (grassroots), and are very numerous in number. support for Islamic political parties. They prefer to support secular political parties such as the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) led by Megawati Sukarno Putri (President of the Republic of Indonesia), or the Golongan Karya Party (Golkar), led by Akbar Tandjung (Chairman of the Indonesian Parliament).
Whether they are aware of it or not, most European scholars who talk about or discuss the role of religion and its relation to politics always regard these two fields as "two areas" which are totally separate (Roesenthal[15]). The same is true when talking about the existence of nationalism in a country. They are more likely to say that they are ethnic or tribal in nature, not religious in nature.
Actually, this opinion is not correct, because in most Islamic countries, religion is the driving force and developer of the national spirit. This matter is clearly seen in Indonesia..." In Indonesia Islam was a force that promoted the rise and growth of Indonesian nationalism" (Nasution, 1995). Follow it again in Indonesia, Islamlah: …..that created in them the consciousness of belonging to the same group. Islam was their rallying point of identity. It was throught Islam that different ethnic groups were united into a large comprehensive community. Islam was able to break the power of local nationalism (Nasution, 1995).
Strictly speaking, nationalism in Indonesia and other Islamic countries begins with the phenomenon of Islamic awakening. Likewise with independence. For the Islamic movement, independence does not only mean "country independence" but also "Muslim independence" and "Islamic independence" (Noer, 1973).
In the 1999 general election, political parties with religious and ethnic identities obtained a small number of votes. The acquisition of these votes gives an important sign that the use of religious and ethnic identities at the national level has received less support than the general public. A similar situation was demonstrated at the 2000 General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), which among other things discussed the Amendments to the 1945 Constitution. At that time, religious-based political parties (Islam) fought for the formalization of Islamic law at the national level through the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in the preamble of the Constitution. 1945. Through tug-of-war with the nationalist group, in the end the effort was not successful. Despite failing at the national level, the desire to fight for formalized Islamic law has not completely faded. They seemed to find their space again along with the presence of decentralization politics under deed No. 20/1999. This situation provides new opportunities for Islamic fundamentalists to be allowed to show identity expression (religion and ethnicity) through the struggle for spaces at the local level. In Sambas Regency this issue is quite strong. The struggle is in the form of sharia regional regulations (regional regulations). Until now such regional regulations already exist in 6 provinces, 38 regencies and 12 cities throughout Indonesia (Noer, 1973).
Instead of having discussions with local politicians (especially in Sumatra), there are a number of reasons raised in the regulation, including (a) to restore local identity ("authenticity") which was eliminated during the New Order regime, (b) positive law is considered not able to overcome social problems (private moral decadence), (c) pressure from members of parliament and Islamic political parties such as PPP and PBB, as well as from Islamic religious leaders, (d) gain support from the local public on a religious basis.
If we pull it back, the politicization of religion that has occurred recently is nothing new, but is related to Indonesia's historical dynamics since its inception until now. Particularly related to the debate in the formulation of the concept of Indonesian statehood, namely the relationship between religion and the state, which has not yet been completed. The desire of some parties to establish an Islamic state in the past (both the post-independence period -BPUPKI in 1945, the 1968 MPRS Special Session, and the 2000 MPR General Session).
In another part, the emergence of identity politics cannot be separated from the intervention of globalization. This factor should not play a relative role, especially because globalization provides an open space for mutual communication for three parties, namely the global community, the nation state, and the local population.
In the current situation where there is an arena of competition between ideologies with various colors, as well as economic issues at various levels, the construction of identities is not free from the influence of one another. Related to this issue, identity politics based on religious identity in the local community can also be understood as a consequence of competition on a global level. Its presence is also widely supported by the country's weak position, both in the political and economic sense.
Quoting Hanneman's statement (Samuel, 2008) onward, regarding the strengthening of identity politics in Indonesia: In the last decade, progress has been seen in protecting identity in Indonesia. Indonesia now has a Population Law. The status of Confucianism is also clear. Chinese New Year no longer needs to be celebrated in secret. What is less encouraging is the crystallization of identity politicization which takes the form of the establishment of political parties. Apart from that, through pressures in drafting national regulations. In fact, many districts now have regional Sharia regulations. One city in Papua is trying to become a "City of the Bible".
We don't know whether the politicization of identity is the end or the means. The excitement at the ratification of the Draft National Education System (SISDIKNAS) deed gave the impression of sharpening the politicization of identity. However, what happened was the legalization of the inclusion of the principles of neoliberalism in the world of education. The SISDIKNAS Law is not a politicization of identity. The question of state interference in teaching religion in schools is more of a momentary issue. There are still many cases that we can record. Chinese New Year celebrations up for grabs. The existence of places of worship is questionable. Some even got damaged. Sociologically, all of that is an interesting thing.
We have witnessed the emergence and development of radicalist movements during the Cold War. Now, it seems that we are witnessing the emergence of neoradicalism. The issue raised is no longer a matter of inequality between workers and employers. However, the struggle in the name of cultural identity. Especially those related to S-A-R-A (Ethnicity, Religion, Race, Inter-group).
Although most social science figures put economic and ethnic differences as the main cause of political conflict, other factors such as religious differences should not be ignored either. In this case, the authors agree with the opinion (Alan R Ball, 1983) that: "Religious diversity may replace race and social class as the chief basis for political conflict.
Another movement that is also strengthening in this era of globalization is fundamentalism. Various groups have emerged to fight for what their supporters call -as "cultural purification".
They view those outside their ranks as the wrong party. They are the ones who consider themselves the most correct in interpreting the teachings. In relation to Muslims, this leads to a distinction between "textual Islam" and "contextual Islam". One positioned itself vis-à-vis the other. Those who suffered losses, not only Muslims. But also Indonesians in general.
No one expected 2009 and beyond to be a bad year. However, it is hard to deny the fact that 2009 -2010 may be a critical period for Indonesians. And the author will not be surprised if the sharpening of identity politicization will occur. Regional elections are taking place in various parts of the archipelago. The Issue of the Son of the Regions strengthened in various regions. This is really sad. In this era of globalization, we actually develop it. There is also no guarantee that the election we are about to carry out will be free from parties trying to fish in murky waters. This is certainly a challenge for Indonesians. Not to make us scared or paranoid. What is needed, flexibility in everyday life.
This religious-oriented political tendency is very worrying, especially for a country consisting of various religions like Indonesia. History proves that in many countries atrocities for the sake of atrocities are committed in the name of religion. Northern Ireland for example is still raging with civil war between Protestants and Catholics. In India, the Muslim minority group that is in the midst of a Hindu-majority society is constantly experiencing threats to life and property. This is what is happening today in the Middle East in Palestine.
To this day, not much is written about political conflicts resulting from religious differences by members of sociologists or members of political science. Among members of sociology who touch on this issue is Talcot Parsons in his essay, "Racial and Religious Differences as Factors in Group Tension (Parsons, 1952). Parson views conflict as "disfunction and disruptive and to disregard its positive functions. Conflict appears as partly social". For him, this conflict is "endemic" like "disease" and "a sick society" must be treated by propaganda experts (Parsons, 1952).

CONCLUSION
Based on the discussion above, this paper can be concluded that the role of the state in counteracting identity politics has been carried out a lot, but the problem is identity politics in the form of cultural politics or cultural identity which so far has been a trigger for conflicts in the community which are still difficult to eliminate. Then religious identity politics also makes it more difficult for the state to minimize the emergence of identity politics. One of the efforts made by the state is to provide understanding to the community regarding the importance of multicultural education. Multicultural education has so far been able to become a tool for the state in counteracting the development of cultural and religious identity politics.