

Legal Review of the Role of Bawaslu in Election Supervision in Blitar City

Erwin Widhiandono, Aditya Chandra Winata

Legal Studies Program, Faculty of Law, Balitar Islamic University, Blitar, Indonesia

ABSTRACT

Election supervision is not only an enforcement function but also a socio-institutional mechanism to ensure election rules work in practice. This article aims to analyze the position, authority, and implementation of the role of the Blitar City Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) in the 2024 Election and explain the socio-legal challenges that affect the effectiveness of supervision. The research uses an empirical/socio-legal approach with a descriptive qualitative design. The primary data consists of official Bawaslu Blitar City supervisory documents, which are analyzed alongside laws and regulations and scientific literature. Validity is carried out through source/document triangulation by comparing normative mandates, supervisory practice documents, and previous research findings. The analysis uses the legal culture perspective of Lawrence M. Friedman and public participation of Archon Fung. The results show that Bawaslu Blitar City has developed a supervisory pattern that combines prevention, vulnerability mapping, stage supervision, documentation, enforcement, coordination, and participatory supervision. However, there is a gap between *das sollen* and *das sein*, especially when legal norms are confronted with political culture, the potential for money politics, limited legal and digital literacy, and the complexity of digital space supervision. Participatory oversight through the media and stakeholders expands oversight capacity, but it needs to be geared toward informed, inclusive participation, and connected to institutional follow-up. This article asserts that the uniqueness of Blitar City is not solely explained by Bawaslu's normative mandate, but rather by the interaction between legal structures, institutional capacity, legal culture, and local participation networks.

Keywords: Bawaslu, election supervision, socio-legal, legal culture, public participation, Blitar City, 2024 Election.

Corresponding author

Name: Erwin Widhiandono

Email: erwinwidhiandono@yahoo.co.id

INTRODUCTION

General elections are a means of exercising popular sovereignty, which in a state governed by the rule of law must be based on the principles of directness, generality, freedom, confidentiality, honesty, and fairness. These principles do not remain constitutional norms but must be translated into procedures, institutional behavior, and social practices that can be monitored. Therefore, the existence of the General Elections Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) is crucial not only for identifying and prosecuting violations, but also for establishing conditions that enable election regulations to be adhered to from the

outset. In this context, the quality of oversight is determined by the relationship between legal structures, institutional capacity, and public acceptance of election norms.

Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections, as amended, among other things, by Law Number 7 of 2023, mandates the Regency/City Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) to prevent and prosecute violations, supervise election stages, prevent money politics, monitor the neutrality of parties prohibited from campaigning, handle reports, and evaluate supervision. This mandate demonstrates that Indonesia's legal design has shifted from a purely reactive model of supervision to one that prioritizes prevention and risk management. Research issues arise precisely at the implementation stage: to what extent this authority structure can function when confronted with social conditions, political culture, and actor networks at the local level.

Blitar City provides a relevant context for understanding these issues. As an urban area, election supervision takes place in a relatively dense social space with interactions between election organizers, participants, government officials, the media, community organizations, and citizens. This heterogeneity of interests makes it difficult to understand supervision as a vertical relationship between the Elections Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) and election participants. It is also a social process involving the exchange of information, the building of trust, and the ability of the public to recognize and report suspected violations. In the digital space, these relationships are further complicated because political communication can be rapid, widespread, and not always easily verified.

Local socio-political characteristics are also important when discussing money politics. This article does not claim that the people of Blitar City empirically possess a specific money politics culture that differs from other regions. However, literature on East Java shows that participatory oversight can confront patrimonial ties and the potential for community co-optation (Hakim & Iztighfari, 2021). These findings provide a comparative context for understanding that citizen participation is not automatically independent. At the local level, close relationships, economic interests, political loyalties, and the perception that giving money is a normal part of contestation can influence citizens' willingness to report. Thus, money politics needs to be read not only as a normative violation, but also as a matter of legal culture and power relations.

Lawrence M. Friedman's legal culture perspective helps explain this issue. Friedman (1969) positions law as part of a social system that interacts with institutions and societal culture. Within this framework, the existence of laws and the authority of the Elections Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) are part of the legal structure, while the way election participants, officials, the media, and citizens understand and respond to the rules is part of the legal culture. The effectiveness of oversight is therefore determined not only by the completeness of the rules, but also by the ability of institutions to translate the rules into behavior that can be complied with, monitored, and accounted for.

The second framework is public participation. Participatory oversight can be understood through Fung's (2006) theory that the quality of participation is determined by who is involved, how they communicate and make decisions, and how that participation connects to public action. This perspective helps distinguish merely symbolic participation

from participation that truly expands oversight capacity. In the context of the Blitar City Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu), media and stakeholder involvement needs to be assessed not simply by the existence of collaborative activities, but by its ability to generate oversight information, strengthen election literacy, and encourage follow-up.

State-of-the-art research on Bawaslu has developed on several issues: strengthening law enforcement authority, participatory oversight, surveillance technology, money politics, apparatus neutrality, and the challenges of law enforcement in the 2024 Election. Yuanita (2023) discusses Bawaslu's adjudication authority; Mahpudin (2021) highlights technology and public participation; while Widhiandono and Ningtyas (2023) examine participatory oversight in Blitar City. Other studies discuss money politics, ASN neutrality, digital surveillance, and the division of authority in handling violations (Diniyanto & Sutrisno, 2022; Hakim & Iztighfari, 2021; Rahman et al., 2024; Regif & Pattipeilohy, 2023).

This article's research gap lies in the limited number of studies that comprehensively link Bawaslu's legal mandate to local socio-institutional conditions. Studies on Bawaslu's authority tend to emphasize normative aspects, while studies on participation more often assess community involvement as an oversight strategy. This article fills this gap by examining Blitar City's oversight practices through the relationship between legal structure, legal culture, institutional capacity, and public participation. The article's novelty lies not in the discovery of Bawaslu's new authority, but rather in interpreting oversight implementation as a socio-legal process that demonstrates how norms negotiate with local social and institutional conditions.

The research problems are: (1) how the role of the Blitar City Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) is implemented in supervising the 2024 Election; (2) how the gap between legal mandates and supervisory practices is influenced by socio-institutional factors; and (3) how participatory supervision and digital supervision can be strengthened. The research objectives are to analyze the implementation of the role of the Blitar City Election Supervisory Agency based on supervisory documents, explain the gap between *das sollen* and *das sein* from a legal culture perspective, and formulate supervisory strengthening that is relevant to the local context.

METHOD

This research employs an empirical/socio-legal approach with a descriptive qualitative design. This approach is based on the nature of the research data, which comprises not only legal norms but also documents documenting the Blitar City Elections Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu)'s oversight actions. The socio-legal approach is used to connect election regulations, known as *das sollen*, with institutional practices and documented social conditions, known as *das sein*. The analysis is not aimed at statistically calculating effectiveness, but rather at explaining implementation patterns, gaps, and factors influencing oversight.

The research data is sourced from official documents of the Blitar City Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) relating to the supervision of the 2024 Election, including documents on monitoring and evaluation of voter data updates, documentation on

campaign stage supervision, Form-A, information on the regulation of campaign props during the quiet period, participatory and media supervision documents, and relevant vulnerability mapping documents. The data is analyzed together with primary legal materials in the form of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections as amended, among others, by Law Number 7 of 2023, Bawaslu Regulation Number 5 of 2022 as amended by Bawaslu Regulation Number 2 of 2024, and KPU Regulation Number 15 of 2023 concerning Election Campaigns. Scientific literature is used to build theoretical interpretations and comparisons.

Data collection was conducted through documentation studies and literature reviews. Document analysis was conducted by coding information into themes: prevention, stage supervision, violation handling, institutional coordination, participatory supervision, money politics, apparatus neutrality, digital supervision, and documentation and follow-up. Data validity was strengthened through source/document triangulation, namely comparing regulatory provisions with Bawaslu practice documents and previous research findings. Differences between sources were not eliminated but were used as analytical material to identify potential gaps between normative mandates and implementation.

The analytical framework uses two perspectives. First, Friedman's (1969) legal culture, specifically the relationship between legal structure and legal culture in determining the operation of rules. Second, Fung's (2006) public participation, which is used to assess the quality of public and media engagement based on who participates, how information is exchanged, and the extent to which participation is connected to oversight. Using this framework, the research results are organized thematically and interpretively.

FINDING AND DISCUSSION

RESEARCH RESULT

Legal Status and Scope of the Role of the Blitar City Election Supervisory Agency

Institutionally, the Blitar City Elections Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) has a strong authority within the election oversight system. However, the document findings indicate that the significance of this authority lies not in the sheer number of provisions that must be implemented, but rather in the ability to translate normative mandates into preventive, supervisory, documentation, and follow-up actions. From a socio-legal perspective, law operates through organizations and actors who interpret and apply rules. Therefore, Bawaslu's authority structure must be interpreted in conjunction with the capacity of supervisors in the field and the social environment in which supervision is conducted.

Bawaslu Regulation Number 5 of 2022 details the oversight mechanism and positions the Regency/City Bawaslu and its subordinate agencies as part of a hierarchical oversight system. This structure allows for oversight to reach the sub-district, village, and polling station (TPS) levels. However, a formal structure does not automatically result in effective oversight. The quality of oversight depends on the supervisors' ability to map risks, collect evidence, document actions, and forward information to the appropriate institutions.

When viewed through Friedman's (1969) theory, the implementation of Blitar City's oversight demonstrates three interconnected elements. The legal structure comprises the authority of the Elections Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu), oversight procedures, and mechanisms for handling violations. Institutional capacity is reflected in coordination, documentation, and hierarchical work. Meanwhile, legal culture is evident in the willingness of election participants and the public to comply with regulations, provide information, and utilize oversight channels. Gaps arise when any of these elements are out of balance: regulations can be comprehensive but difficult to enforce if evidence is lacking; participation can be high but ineffective if information cannot be verified; and coordination can be extensive but unproductive if responsibilities between institutions are unclear.

Table 1. Dimensions of the Role of the Blitar City Election Supervisory Agency in Supervising the 2024 Election

Role Dimensions	Legal Mandate	Implementation in Blitar City
Prevention	Identification and mapping of potential violations; coordination and education.	Monitoring, coordination, vulnerability mapping, and strengthening participatory supervision.
Stage supervision	Supervision of voter data, nominations, campaigns, logistics, voting and vote counting.	Monitoring voter data updates, campaign supervision, and monitoring stages.
Action/handling	Receive reports, examine and review alleged violations and exercise dispute resolution authority.	Handling of alleged violations through mechanisms and coordination in accordance with provisions.
Participatory	Increase public participation in supervision.	Collaboration with media and stakeholder engagement.

Source: Processed by the author based on election regulations and supervisory documents from the Blitar City Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) which were analyzed in the research.

Implementation of Blitar City Bawaslu Supervision in the 2024 Election

Supervision documents show that in the 2024 Election, the Blitar City Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) carried out preventive and direct oversight functions. Monitoring and evaluation of voter data updates for the Final Voter List (DPTb) and Final Voter List (DPK), for example, were carried out in coordination with the Sub-district Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu) and the Population and Civil Registration Office. This practice demonstrates that oversight of voting rights cannot be achieved simply by

examining voter documents but requires cross-institutional information exchange. This is where oversight becomes an institutional process that connects constitutional rights norms with population administration.

During the campaign phase, the use of the Data House and Form-A demonstrates the importance of documentation as an accountability tool. From a legal culture perspective, documentation is more than just administrative work. It is a means of building a culture of compliance within the institution, as every supervisory action must be traceable. Documentation also strengthens Bawaslu's position if supervisory information develops into a report or alleged violation requiring verification.

The dismantling of campaign materials during the quiet period of February 11–13, 2024, demonstrated a form of oversight involving multiple actors. The Elections Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) conducted the dismantling after notifying election participants and coordinating with the police, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), the Public Order Agency (Satpol PP), the Transportation Agency (Dishub), the Environment Agency (DLH), the Sub-district Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu), and the Village Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu). By the second day, approximately 95 percent of the installed materials had been removed. Institutionally, this achievement demonstrates that participant compliance and coordination skills can reduce the need for harsher enforcement. However, this effectiveness still needs to be seen as a result of the interaction between Bawaslu's authority, participant compliance, and the support of other institutions.

The participatory dimension is evident in the formation of a task force for oversight and monitoring of news reporting, broadcasting, and campaign advertising, involving media organizations. Using Fung's (2006) framework, this collaboration is valuable when the media are not merely recipients of information but also become part of an information-exchange ecosystem that helps identify issues and connect them to oversight actions. Therefore, participation is measured not only by the number of partners involved, but also by the quality of the information produced and its follow-up.

This implementation demonstrates a shift from a reactive oversight model to one based on preventive, risk-based, documentation-based, and participatory oversight. However, this change in model does not necessarily resolve all issues. Gaps may still arise when public information lacks sufficient evidence, when participation stops at socialization, or when digital oversight expands faster than institutional capacity. Therefore, oversight success needs to be assessed as an ongoing process, not solely based on the number of enforcement actions or violations detected.

Socio-Institutional Context and Vulnerability of the 2024 Election

Discussions of vulnerabilities require a distinction between the 2024 Election and the 2024 General Election/Regional Election. Data specifically derived from mapping vulnerable polling stations in the 2024 Election are not treated as 2024 Election violation statistics. These data are used limitedly as institutional learning about the types of risks Bawaslu needs to anticipate. This distinction is important so that the analysis does not conflate the two election stages and contexts.

For the 2024 Election, oversight challenges include voter data quality, money politics, official neutrality, technical violations, and campaign oversight. In an urban social context, these risks operate through a network of relationships not always visible in formal structures. Election participants interact with citizens, community leaders, the media, officials, and local organizations. Therefore, oversight must be able to understand the relationships between actors while still operating based on evidence and legal authority.

Money politics is the clearest example of the gap between *das sollen* and *das sein*. Normatively, money politics is prohibited, and the Elections Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) has a mandate to prevent and address it. Socially, the provision of money or certain fees can be perceived as assistance, transportation costs, or a form of remuneration, blurring the line between social practices and legal violations. Literature on East Java shows that patrimonial ties and community co-optation can be obstacles to participatory oversight (Hakim & Iztighfari, 2021). Therefore, the Blitar City Elections Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) strategy needs to integrate legal literacy, secure reporting channels, and mapping of vulnerable actors/areas into a single framework, rather than separate activities.

For the 2024 Election, the Blitar City Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) mapped 26 indicators across eight variables to identify vulnerable polling stations (TPS). Among these, 45 TPS were identified as having ineligible voters on the final voter list (DPT), 23 TPS with voters outside the domicile of the TPS where they were assigned, and 71 TPS with voters with disabilities registered on the DPT. This data is mapping data specifically for the 2024 Election, not statistics on 2024 Election violations. Its value to research lies in its ability to demonstrate that oversight of voter data and access to vulnerable groups is a risk area that requires continued oversight.

Civil servant neutrality also demonstrates the importance of prevention. The promotion of civil servant neutrality ahead of the 2024 elections demonstrates the importance of oversight before allegations of violations arise. From a socio-legal perspective, civil servant compliance is determined not only by legal prohibitions but also by perceptions of the boundaries of acceptable behavior in employment and political relations. Therefore, legal education and preventive documentation are crucial in fostering a culture of compliance.

Digital surveillance adds a new dimension. Social media allows political messages, disinformation, and manipulative content to spread rapidly through algorithmic networks. In a post-truth situation, information acceptance does not always depend on accuracy, but on emotional closeness, group identity, and repetition. Diniyanto and Sutrisno (2022) position the post-truth era as a challenge for election oversight. For the Blitar City Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu), the problem is not only finding posts, but also verifying context, preserving electronic evidence, assessing the relevance of norms, and collaborating with other parties when content exceeds local authority. Limited public digital literacy can also make it difficult for the public to distinguish between legitimate political information, misinformation, and disinformation.

Gap Analysis of Das Sollen and Das Sein

Research findings indicate that the primary gap lies not in the lack of a legal mandate, but in the process of translating that mandate into consistent action. Das sollen demands preventive, objective, documented, and accountable oversight. Das sein demonstrates that implementation requires cross-institutional coordination, participant compliance, public participation, and technological capabilities. In other words, the effectiveness of election law is relational: norms do not operate in isolation, but through institutions and the behavior of actors.

From Friedman's (1969) perspective, strengthening structures without changing the legal culture will have limited effects. Adding rules or oversight instruments will not automatically increase compliance if the public does not understand their rights and obligations or if certain violations are considered common practice. Conversely, a legal culture that supports compliance requires a responsive structure so that public reports do not remain as information without follow-up. This two-way relationship explains why election law education and reporting mechanisms need to work together.

Public participation must also be understood critically. Fung (2006) points out that the design of participation varies depending on who is involved, how communication occurs, and the relationship between participation and public action. In the context of Blitar City, media collaboration can expand oversight, but it is insufficient without verification and follow-up mechanisms. Similarly, outreach to citizens does not automatically constitute participatory oversight if citizens only receive information. More substantive participation requires reporting channels, feedback, whistleblower protection, and transparency regarding the follow-up process.

Therefore, the effectiveness of the Blitar City Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) is more accurately measured by its ability to prevent risks, ensure traceability of oversight actions, respond to reports in a timely manner, and build public trust. The number of violations detected cannot be the sole measure. In an institution that prioritizes prevention, a low number of violations can indicate successful prevention or limited detection. Therefore, indicators must link mapped risks, preventative actions, information received, verification results, follow-up, and public feedback.

Strengthening the Election Monitoring Model in Blitar City

First, Bawaslu needs to maintain updated risk mapping at every stage. The mapping should not only record the types of violations but also link locations, actors, vulnerable groups, communication patterns, and prevention strategies. This model helps transform vulnerability data into oversight priorities.

Second, documentation and internal audits need to be strengthened. Form A and oversight documents should be linked to follow-up actions to determine whether risks have been prevented, whether information has been verified, and whether escalation is necessary. Consistent documentation is also crucial for maintaining accountability when Bawaslu decisions are challenged.

Third, election law education must be directed at changing legal culture. The material should not only prohibit money politics but also explain how to recognize violations, reporting procedures, whistleblower protections, the different types of violations, and legal consequences. This type of education can bridge the gap between formal norms and public understanding.

Fourth, public participation needs to be designed in a more substantive way. Bawaslu can expand its collaboration with the media, universities, community organizations, first-time voter groups, and local communities. Referring to Fung (2006), each form of participation needs to have a clear purpose, communication mechanism, and link to oversight activities. Thus, collaboration should not stop at ceremonial.

Fifth, digital oversight capacity must be enhanced. Supervisors need procedures for content verification, electronic evidence preservation, time and source recording, and coordination when digital content is linked to areas or actors outside Blitar City. This approach is crucial for countering disinformation, manipulatively produced content, and algorithm-driven information dissemination.

Sixth, coordination for handling violations needs to be built on a clear division of responsibilities and timelines. Coordination with the General Elections Commission (KPU), the police, the prosecutor's office through the Gakkumdu Center, local governments, the Public Order Agency (Satpol PP), the Transportation Agency (Dishub), the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI/Polri), the media, and other stakeholders must respect each other's authority. The goal is not to increase the number of coordination forums, but to ensure that every piece of supervisory information has a clear follow-up path.

DISCUSSION

The findings indicate that the role of Bawaslu Blitar City in the 2024 Election cannot be understood solely from the perspective of its formal legal authority. Although the legal framework provides Bawaslu with extensive supervisory functions, including prevention, supervision of electoral stages, handling of violations, prevention of money politics, supervision of neutrality, and evaluation, the implementation of these functions is strongly influenced by institutional capacity, inter-agency coordination, legal culture, and public participation. This finding reinforces the socio-legal perspective that the effectiveness of law is determined not only by the existence of legal norms but also by how those norms are interpreted and implemented by institutions and social actors.

Relationship Between Legal Authority and Institutional Practice

The implementation of Bawaslu Blitar City's supervisory function demonstrates that formal authority becomes meaningful only when translated into concrete institutional practices. The documents examined in this study show that supervision was carried out through prevention, risk mapping, monitoring of electoral stages, documentation, coordination, and enforcement. Monitoring of voter data, supervision of campaign activities, and the removal of campaign materials during the quiet period demonstrate that Bawaslu's role was not limited to responding to violations after they occurred.

This finding is consistent with the development of the electoral supervision model, which increasingly emphasizes preventive supervision rather than purely repressive enforcement. In this context, prevention becomes important because many electoral violations are influenced by conditions that can be identified before they develop into formal violations. Risk mapping, coordination with relevant institutions, and communication with election participants therefore function as instruments for reducing the probability of violations.

From Friedman's legal culture perspective, however, institutional authority represents only one component of the legal system. The implementation of supervision also depends on the interaction between legal structure and legal culture. The structure is represented by Bawaslu's authority, supervisory procedures, and mechanisms for handling violations, while legal culture is reflected in the willingness of election participants and citizens to comply with regulations, provide information, and use available reporting mechanisms. The findings demonstrate that these components cannot operate independently. A strong legal structure may have limited practical effects when actors do not understand or accept the applicable norms.

The findings concerning campaign supervision further demonstrate the importance of institutional documentation. The use of Form-A, Rumah Data, and other supervisory documents provides traceability of supervisory actions. Documentation therefore has a dual function: it serves as an administrative instrument and simultaneously strengthens institutional accountability. In the context of legal enforcement, traceable documentation is particularly important because information obtained through supervision may subsequently require verification and evidentiary support.

Prevention, Coordination, and the Transformation of the Supervisory Model

The implementation of the 2024 Election supervision in Blitar City shows a shift from a reactive model toward a preventive and risk-based model. This shift can be observed in the emphasis on monitoring, risk mapping, coordination, and public participation. The removal of campaign materials during the quiet period provides a concrete illustration. Bawaslu coordinated with the police, TNI, Satpol PP, Dishub, DLH, Panwaslu Kecamatan, and Panwaslu Kelurahan. The reported removal of approximately 95 percent of campaign materials by the second day indicates that coordination and prior notification can contribute to compliance without relying exclusively on coercive enforcement.

Nevertheless, this finding should not be interpreted simply as evidence that institutional supervision has completely resolved electoral risks. The achievement resulted from interaction among Bawaslu's authority, the compliance of election participants, and the support of other institutions. Consequently, supervisory effectiveness is relational rather than institutional in isolation. This corresponds with Friedman's perspective that legal institutions operate within a broader social system.

The same pattern appears in voter-data supervision. Monitoring DPTb and DPK involved coordination between Bawaslu's supervisory structures and the Population and Civil Registration Office. This demonstrates that electoral supervision can intersect with

administrative systems outside the electoral institution itself. Protection of voting rights therefore requires not only electoral regulations but also the availability and accuracy of supporting administrative information.

This finding also supports the argument that strengthening Bawaslu's supervisory capacity should not be interpreted merely as increasing the number of rules or supervisory instruments. Institutional capacity includes the ability to interpret information, coordinate with other institutions, document actions, verify evidence, and ensure that information reaches the institution with authority to act.

Legal Culture and the Problem of Money Politics

Money politics illustrates one of the most significant gaps between *das sollen* and *das sein*. From a normative perspective, money politics is prohibited and Bawaslu has preventive and enforcement responsibilities. In practice, however, the meaning of money or other forms of material assistance may be interpreted differently within local social relations. Certain forms of giving may be understood as transportation assistance, social assistance, or reciprocal relationships, creating difficulties in distinguishing ordinary social interaction from electoral violations.

This finding should be understood within the framework of legal culture. Hakim and Iztighfari (2021), in their study of East Java, identify patrimonial ties and social co-optation as challenges to participatory supervision. The relevance of this finding for the present study is not to claim that Blitar City possesses an empirically identical political-money culture, but to show that electoral supervision operates within social relationships that may influence citizens' willingness to report suspected violations.

The implication is that the prevention of money politics cannot rely solely on legal prohibition. Legal literacy must also explain what constitutes a violation, how citizens can report suspected violations, what evidence is relevant, and what protections are available to reporters. Without this knowledge, public participation may remain passive even when citizens encounter potentially problematic electoral practices.

Therefore, strengthening legal culture becomes complementary to strengthening institutional enforcement. Public education should not merely communicate that money politics is prohibited but should develop citizens' capacity to recognize, document, and report potential violations. In this respect, legal culture becomes an important bridge between formal electoral law and everyday social practices.

Participatory Supervision and the Quality of Public Involvement

The findings also demonstrate that public participation expands the supervisory capacity of Bawaslu, particularly through cooperation with media and other stakeholders. However, participation should not be measured merely by the number of institutions or communities involved. Fung's (2006) framework emphasizes that the quality of participation depends on who participates, how communication takes place, and how participation is connected to public action.

In the context of Blitar City, cooperation with media organizations can provide an additional source of information regarding campaign activities, political communication, and potentially problematic content. Nevertheless, media participation becomes substantively meaningful only when the information generated can be verified and connected to an institutional follow-up mechanism.

The same principle applies to public education and socialization. Socialization activities may increase awareness, but awareness does not automatically constitute participatory supervision. Participation becomes more substantive when citizens have access to reporting channels, receive feedback regarding their reports, and can understand the subsequent institutional process.

This interpretation is consistent with previous research on participatory supervision, including Widhiandono and Ningtyas (2023), which discusses participatory supervision in preventing electoral violations in Blitar City. The present findings extend this perspective by emphasizing that participation should be understood not merely as involvement but as an information and accountability mechanism. The value of participation therefore lies in its capacity to produce reliable information and connect that information with supervisory action.

Digital Supervision and Institutional Capacity

Another important finding concerns the increasing complexity of digital supervision. Social media enables political information to circulate rapidly and across institutional boundaries. This creates a challenge because the speed of information circulation may exceed the institutional capacity to verify and respond to it.

Diniyanto and Sutrisno (2022) identify the post-truth era as a challenge for election supervision. The present study confirms the institutional implications of this challenge. Bawaslu is not only required to identify potentially problematic content but must also assess its context, preserve electronic evidence, determine the relevance of electoral regulations, and coordinate with other institutions when digital content involves actors or circumstances beyond the authority of local supervisors.

Digital supervision therefore requires a different form of institutional capacity from conventional supervision. Evidence preservation, source verification, time recording, digital literacy, and inter-institutional coordination become increasingly important. Without these capabilities, the availability of large amounts of digital information may not necessarily increase supervisory effectiveness.

The findings consequently suggest that digital supervision should be integrated into the broader risk-based supervision model. Digital risks should be mapped alongside conventional electoral risks, while supervisory procedures need to establish clear mechanisms for verification and escalation. This is particularly important because misinformation and manipulative political content may spread before institutional verification can be completed.

CONCLUSION

The role of the Blitar City Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) in overseeing the 2024 Election has shifted from an enforcement-oriented approach to a combination of prevention, risk mapping, stage oversight, documentation, coordination, enforcement, and public participation. This implementation demonstrates that Bawaslu's legal mandate is institutionally adequate, but its effectiveness depends on its ability to translate norms into consistent and traceable actions.

From a socio-legal perspective, the gap between *das sollen* and *das sein* arises primarily because election law interacts with legal culture, relations between actors, the quality of public participation, and the development of digital technology. Money politics demonstrates the importance of understanding cultural dimensions and power relations, while digital surveillance demonstrates that institutional capacity must evolve in line with changing patterns of political communication. The 2024 Election data regarding polling stations (TPS) is vulnerable to being used as a risk assessment and should not be integrated into the 2024 Election violation statistics.

Strengthening oversight in Blitar City needs to be directed at data-based risk mapping, oversight documentation and audits, legal education oriented toward changing legal culture, public participation linked to follow-up, and increasing digital oversight capacity. Thus, the uniqueness of oversight in Blitar City can be understood not only from the Bawaslu's normative authority, but also from the interaction between legal structures, institutional capacity, legal culture, and local participation networks.

REFERENCES

- Abra, E. H. (2024). Problems of law enforcement in the 2024 General Election in Indonesia. *Journal of the Bawaslu of the Riau Islands Province*, 6(1). <https://doi.org/10.55108/jbk.v6i01.440>
- Amal, B. (2024). The effectiveness of participatory oversight in reducing the number of violations in the 2024 election in West Java. *Journal of Electoral Justice*, 5(2), 205–214. <https://doi.org/10.55108/jkp.v5i2.491>
- Anindyajati, T. (2023). The polemic of the follow-up to Bawaslu's recommendations in the dispute over regional election results at the Constitutional Court. *Jurnal Adhyasta Pemilu*, 6(1), 28–37. <https://doi.org/10.55108/jap.v6i1.177>
- Diniyanto, A., & Sutrisno, W. (2022). Election monitoring in the post-truth era: Problems, challenges, and strategies. *Jurnal Adhyasta Pemilu*, 5(1), 44–58. <https://doi.org/10.55108/jap.v5i1.79>
- Endrawati. (2024). Problems of law enforcement in realizing electoral justice from the perspective of election supervisors. *Jurnal Huma Betang Demokrasi*, 1(1). <https://doi.org/10.55108/hbd.v1i1.189>
- Friedman, L. M. (1969). Legal culture and social development. *Law & Society Review*, 4(1), 29–44. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3052760>
- Fung, A. (2006). Varieties of participation in complex governance. *Public Administration Review*, 66(s1), 66–75. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00667.x>

- Hakim, A. I., & Iztighfari, D. L. (2021). The dilemma of participatory oversight: Patrimonial ties and co-opted communities in East Java. *Jurnal Adhyasta Pemilu*, 2(2), 145–156. <https://doi.org/10.55108/jap.v2i2.28>
- Jamaludin, A. (2023). Re-positioning the role and authority of the General Elections Supervisory Body in handling election crimes. *Journal of Election Justice*, 4(1). <https://doi.org/10.55108/jkp.v4i1.421>
- Kania, D. (2019). Information technology-based election law enforcement. *Journal of Election Justice*, 1(1). <https://doi.org/10.55108/jkp.v1i1.152>
- Kusdianita, S., Hartana, M., & Arsyad, M. Z. (2022). Women as social capital for participatory oversight in the community: A study of the implementation of anti-money politics in the Sardonoarjo Village, Sleman Regency. *Jurnal Adhyasta Pemilu*, 5(1). <https://doi.org/10.55108/jap.v5i1.84>
- Mahpudin. (2021). Gowaslu as electoral technology: Public involvement in online-based participatory supervision. *Jurnal Adhyasta Pemilu*, 4(2), 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.55108/jap.v4i2.53>
- Pagiling, G. A. (2024). The role of Bawaslu in increasing the active participation of the community in participatory supervision of the 2024 regional elections in West Java through the Citizens' Forum. *Journal of Electoral Justice*, 5(2), 194–204. <https://doi.org/10.55108/jkp.v5i2.490>
- Rahman, N. E., Mukhlisin, L., & Pramudita, D. A. (2024). The Role of the Besuki Situbondo District Election Supervisory Committee in Minimizing Money Politics in the 2024 Election. *Journal of Election Justice*, 5(1), 28–36. <https://doi.org/10.55108/jkp.v5i1.410>
- Ramadhan, D., Mahuze, A., & Afifah, N. F. (2023). Initiating asymmetric oversight: Maturation of democracy through an asymmetric oversight model. *Journal of the Bawaslu of the Riau Islands Province*, 5(1), 1–12. <https://doi.org/10.55108/jbk.v5i01.306>
- Ramadhan, M. N. (2021). Evaluation of the enforcement of election criminal law in the implementation of the 2019 Election. *Jurnal Adhyasta Pemilu*, 2(2), 115–127. <https://doi.org/10.55108/jap.v2i2.12>
- Regif, S. Y., & Pattipeilohy, A. (2023). Abuse of the role of state civil servants (ASN) in electoral misconduct in regional elections in Indonesia. *Jurnal Adhyasta Pemilu*, 6(1), 38–48. <https://doi.org/10.55108/jap.v6i1.62>
- Rosidin, U. (2024). Increasing participatory oversight in the implementation of regional head elections. *Journal of Electoral Justice*, 5(1), 12–26. <https://doi.org/10.55108/jkp.v5i1.455>
- Satria, I. R., & Rahman, M. R. T. (2023). Participatory oversight and efforts to improve our level of democracy. *Journal of Electoral Justice*, 4(2), 61–72. <https://doi.org/10.55108/jkp.v4i2.427>
- Supondho Akbar, W. (2022). Criminal law policy in enforcing election crimes. *Journal of Election Justice*, 3(1), 34–47. <https://doi.org/10.55108/jkp.v3i1.271>

- Supriyadi, S., Purnamasari, A. I., & Darmiati, D. (2023). Conceptualization of election law enforcement clinics in handling violations in the 2024 elections. *Jurnal Adhyasta Pemilu*, 6(1), 49–58. <https://doi.org/10.55108/jap.v6i1.216>
- Widhiandono, E., & Ningtyas, R. W. (2023). Participatory supervision in preventing violations in the 2024 Election: A study at the Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) of Blitar City. *Birokrasi: Journal of Law and Constitutional Studies*, 1(3), 327–341. <https://doi.org/10.55606/birokrasi.v1i3.610>
- Yuanita, A. C. (2023). Bawaslu's authority in enforcing electoral law and justice: An analysis of administrative election violations through adjudication authority. *Bawaslu Journal of Riau Islands Province*, 5(2), 61–71. <https://doi.org/10.55108/jbk.v5i02.310>